The finding of the paper shows the relative effectiveness of the 'one size fits all' policy of the European Central Bank. The paper provides strong evidence in favour of this by testing whether the monetary policy effects (footprints), found in inflation uncertainty converge to a common level. These footprints are measured as the fraction of the estimated policy-induced reduction in this uncertainty. The testing was conducted by applying a bootstrap-type test in a regression of the rate of growth of these fractions on their initial values, computed for 16 euro area countries. (JEL codes: C33, E52, E58).
INTRODUCTION
One of the principal arguments for how the European Monetary Union can be economically effective in the allocative sense was made in 2005 in the speech by Ottmar Issing, then Chief
Economist of the European Central Bank (ECB), at the International Research Forum on Monetary
Policy. In this speech Issing (2005) reinforced his earlier point (Issing, 2001) in favour of the 'one size fits all' hypothesis for the single interest rate policy of the ECB. His main argument came from a reinterpretation of the real interest rate effect on growth when there are regional inflation differentials (see e.g. Caporale and Kontonikas, 2009 ). In the original interpretation, an interest rate determined by a single central bank would result in the real interest rate being relatively low in countries with high inflation, so stimulating growth, and relatively high in countries with low inflation, resulting in divergence in growth rates and increased uncertainty about inflation. Issing's counterargument was that investment decisions are based on ex-ante rather than ex-post real interest rates, or expected rather than historical inflation. If expected inflation is not idiosyncratic, then its dispersion between countries will not increase and no divergence in growth will occur.
Ten years after the speech the empirical evidence has been mixed. Some signs of inflation convergence were noticed five years after the creation of the euro (Mongelli and Vega, 2006; Busetti et al, 2007) and were confirmed later (Lopez and Papell, 2012) , but the empirical support of real sphere convergence in the euro area is less evident. Although there are signs that there was convergence in output and unemployment before 2007, substantial divergence has been observed after that date (Estrada, Galí and López Salido, 2013; Monfort, Cuestas and Ordóñez, 2013) . This makes it difficult either to disprove or to confirm Issing's hypothesis by evaluating the traditional convergence hypothesis.
However, convergence in levels of inflation does not necessarily imply that inflation uncertainty converges as well. This paper attempts to shed new light on the 'one size fits all' hypothesis and provide empirical evidence of a different type based on an evaluation of the effects of monetary policy on inflation uncertainty. The logic here is that Issing's (2005) conjecture that investment decisions are based on an ex-ante real interest rate reflecting the entire euro area implies that there is some uncertainty about future euro inflation. There may be some external factors, fiscal or political, which increase inflation uncertainty from its relatively low level. In this context the question arises of whether the economic policy of the euro area can successfully reduce the uncertainty by a similar proportion across countries. In a way this also relates to the conjecture of Arnold and Lemmen (2008) that, within the euro area, 'inflation uncertainty may increase in countries that have a smaller influence on ECB policy'.
The traditional approach to measuring inflation uncertainty is to calculate a measure of its variability and then evaluate changes in it over time (see e.g. Caporale, Onorante and Paesani, 2012; Lopez and Papell, 2012) . As high inflation usually corresponds to higher dispersion of inflation, expost or ex-ante, periods of high inflation were historically associated with higher uncertainty. Other approaches are needed, however, in the current economic realities when the level of inflation is low.
There is a growing literature discussing different approaches to defining and measuring inflation uncertainty and, more generally, macroeconomic uncertainty (see e.g. Giordani and Söderlind, 2003; Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2015; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015; and Makarova, 2014 , for a comprehensive discussion and overview). Inflation uncertainty is generally regarded as being detrimental to growth, either directly through the effect on long-term interest rates (Golob, 1994) , or indirectly as a component of macroeconomic uncertainty, where it affects long-term transactional insurance and option costs (Bloom, 2014) .
Verification of the hypothesis that ECB monetary policy is creating cross-country convergence in reducing inflation uncertainty is the main topic of this paper. It is important to note that convergence in reducing uncertainty resulting from a policy action is not the same as convergence in uncertainty itself nor, indeed, in levels of inflation. In this paper, inflation uncertainty is expressed by the dispersion of inflation forecast errors (see e.g. Clements, 2014) . However, following Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) , further inference in this paper is based on the entire distribution of forecast errors rather than on its dispersion alone. It adapts the methodology proposed in Charemza, Díaz and Makarova (2015) , where the weighted skew normal distribution (WSN) is fitted to pseudo expost forecast errors for annual inflation measured monthly. The parameters of the WSN can be interpreted as reflecting the monetary policy influence on uncertainty. This allows the relative effect of such a policy in reducing uncertainty to be evaluated. One measure of such effects is called the uncertainty ratio. If Issing's arguments are correct, the necessary condition for the 'one size fits all' hypothesis is that the uncertainty ratios across the euro area countries should converge to a common level, called the Common Uncertainty Reduction Effect in this paper (CURE), and convergence to the CURE is called CURE-convergence. Bloom (2014) provides evidence that macroeconomic uncertainty is countercyclical to growth, and this is confirmed further by Henzel and Rengel (2017) . Their findings support the real options theory (Bernanke, 1983; Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; McDonald and Siegel, 1986 ) and increasing of risk premia in times of uncertainty. As inflation uncertainty represents an essential part of macroeconomic uncertainty, divergence in inflation uncertainty in the countries of a currency union is likely to result in a divergence in growth in the real sector due to this countercyclicality. Therefore, if CURE-convergence exists, it documents the long-run tendency for monetary policy outcomes to be unified across countries.
The empirical model for testing CURE-convergence consists of regressing the rate of growth in the uncertainty ratio computed for different forecast horizons on the initial conditions. The construction of this is to some extent technically similar to that of fixed effect panel data models. However, the model is static by its nature as it has two cross-sectional dimensions, rather than crosssectional and time series dimensions. In this case the traditional standard errors of the estimates are not valid, as the distributions of the uncertainty ratios for different forecast horizons are usually not normal and might be highly interdependent. Consequently, it has been decided to apply the moving blocks bootstrap method here (Gonçalves, 2011) . The main message of the paper is that despite the obstacles caused by the global financial crisis in 2007-2011 and the euro area debt crisis that has been bubbling away since 2009, monetary policy in the euro area provides strong and statistically significant support for CURE-convergence. If Issing's 'one size fits all' hypothesis is to be understood more broadly as the tendency of the effects of a single monetary policy on inflation forecast uncertainty across the euro countries to converge, this is what the CURE-convergence indicates.
The further structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses possible reasons for the divergence in inflation uncertainty given the convergence in levels. Section 3 applies some simple measures of inflation uncertainty and, without formal testing, illustrates the existence of such divergence in the euro area. Section 4 proposes a formal model for testing the convergence in reducing inflation uncertainty that is due to monetary policy and discusses its stochastic assumptions and estimation. Section 5 gives the main empirical results, Section 6 discusses their robustness, and Section 7 concludes.
ECB MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION UNCERTAINTY
It is generally, albeit not universally, agreed that economic growth benefits from a reduction in macroeconomic uncertainty, a substantial component of which is inflation uncertainty (see e.g. Bloom, 2014; Vavra, 2014; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015) . There are numerous factors which cause inflation uncertainty to be different across the region. The heterogeneity of inflation uncertainty in a cross section of countries can be explained by the following main factors: (i) A different level of inflation in each country. The level of inflation is often different between countries because of heterogeneous long-run factors like consumers' preferences, tax structures, asynchronous business cycles, employment structure, foreign trade diversification, the structure of credit channels and others. According to the Friedman-Ball hypothesis (Ball, 1992; Friedman, 1977 ), countries with a higher level of inflation should also have higher inflation uncertainty. The Friedman-Ball hypothesis is an alternative to the Cukierman-Meltzer (1986) hypothesis that positive causality goes from inflation uncertainty to inflation. In either case, it would be expected that high inflation uncertainty would be observed in times of high inflation and low inflation uncertainty in times of low inflation.
(ii) Various idiosyncratic factors which might not change the level of inflation, and so not trigger the Friedman-Ball effect, but may affect uncertainty in a direct way. The factors here include political uncertainty (for a theoretical treatment see Davig, Leeper and Walker, 2011) , a lack of fiscal transparency or discipline, an unclear legal structure for long-term investment, unemployment threats, corrupt credit and microfinance channels, and others. These factors are predominantly country-specific, affecting uncertainty differently in different countries and resulting in heterogeneity in country-relative risk regimes (see e.g. Belke and Kronen, 2015; Delrio, 2016) . However, there is some econometric evidence suggesting that in at least some euro area countries inflation uncertainty has risen in recent years despite the continuously low level of inflation (Chowdhury and Sarkar, 2013) . From more recent non-econometric accounts of growing size fits all' policy. As markets expected that it would be introduced, it stabilised inflation in some euro area countries but did not affect the dynamics of inflation uncertainty, as they were not embedded in the historical inflation records. Growing inflation uncertainty with a low level of inflation in this period indicates that the factors in (ii) were gaining in importance, particularly the political and fiscal uncertainty.
In the light of this, it might be interesting to find out not just how far inflation uncertainty in each country is reduced by ECB policy, but how effective this policy was in balancing uncertainty reduction across the euro area countries. Long-term success here should result in some convergence of measures for this reduction across countries.
MEASURING UNCERTAINTY
There are two widely used ways of measuring inflation forecast uncertainty. One, called the ex-ante approach, takes data from a panel of forecasts produced by surveys of individual forecasters and uses the dispersion between these forecasts as a benchmark measure of uncertainty ('uncertainty by disagreement'; see e.g. Bomberger, 1999; Lahiri and Sheng, 2010) . This is sometimes accompanied by evaluations of uncertainty expressed by experts on the basis of their subjective knowledge (see e.g. Giordani and Söderlind, 2003; Patton and Timmermann, 2010) . The other approach, known as ex-post, is based on analysis of past forecast errors and is often used by practitioners in central banks. Methods combining both the ex-post and ex-ante approaches have more recently been proposed (Lahiri, Peng and Sheng, 2014; Rossi, Sekhposyan and Soupre, 2016) .
The main problem with the ex-ante approach is that the survey-based measures often suffer from cross-section and time series heterogeneity, time inconsistency and possible herd behaviour among individual forecasters (see e.g. Andrade and Bihan, 2013; Makarova, 2014; Clements, 2015;  and, in the context of the forecasts produced by the ECB panel of forecasters, Abel et al. 2016) . The concept of inflation uncertainty used here is ex-post forecast uncertainty based on the distribution of the past forecast errors of a forecasting model. The ex-post forecast uncertainty is easy to compute, and its interpretation is straightforward. It does not depend on the size or quality of the pool of forecasters and is free from political, emotional and sociological bias. However, such uncertainty is model-dependent, and quite often the number of observations used for computing the uncertainty measure of individual ex-post forecast errors is small.
To obtain observations on uncertainty, let us first define the concept of a baseline inflation forecast for time th  ( 0 h  ) as being publically available to all agents at time t (inclusive of t). The series of such forecasts has been computed in the pseudo out of sample way, so they are obtained in continuously expanding windows (Stock and Watson, 2007) , as:
where h denotes the forecast horizon,
; t  is the observed headline HICP inflation at time t; |t h t   is the trend inflation h-step ahead point forecast from the ARIMA-
GARCH model, estimated with data up to time t (inclusive of t);
| t h t e  are the trend inflation forecast errors of the forecast made in time t for th  ; T is the total length of the data series;
and data for the period from 1 to 0 t (inclusive) are used for the initial model estimation. It is further assumed that this forecast is a 'common knowledge' forecast that does not constitute information relevant for monetary policy but can be improved upon by ECB forecasters.
Evidently the choice of model used for computing the baseline forecast is, to an extent, arbitrary, and selecting another model might lead to a different series of baseline forecast errors being obtained. It has been decided to use the ARIMA-GARCH model as the forecasting tool, for two main reasons. The first is related to its interpretation. In the concept of monetary policy-induced uncertainty applied in this paper, the point forecasts for which errors are subsequently computed represent a forecasted 'common knowledge' (trend) inflation, where the autoregressive models perform well (see Clark and Doh, 2014) . The underlying assumption is that as such forecasts are commonly known, only improvements in them might influence monetary policy decisions. This can be supported by Phelps and Taylor (1977) , Fisher (1977) , and Orphanides and Williams (2005) , and on game-theoretical grounds by Morris and Shin, (2002) . The second reason for using the ARIMA-GARCH model is its simplicity, flexibility, low computational costs and, above all, the fact that its forecasting properties are comparable with those of more complex multivariate models and stochastic volatility models in its forecasting properties (see e.g. Bjørnland et al., 2012; Buelens, 2012; Clark and Ravazzolo, 2015; Mitchell, Robertson and Wright, 2015) .
A single observation on the h-steps ahead uncertainty in time t is defined as:
where
is the h-step ahead forecast of GARCH conditional variance and (2) is in line with the understanding of forecast uncertainty, which does not include the forecastable variation (see Clements, 2014) . Consequently, the monetary policy affects only the part of total uncertainty expressed by forecast errors, which is unforecastable by the first and second moments of the model. The baseline forecast errors (1) have been obtained by estimating the ARIMA(p,1,1)-GARCH(1,1) models by the maximum likelihood method using monthly data on the annual HICP inflation. ARIMA-GARCH models with more complex lags structure have also been tried and discarded as being not more accurate than simpler models, or due to numerical problems in estimation. The computations have been made for 16 of the 18 euro area countries, excluding Cyprus and Slovakia, for which there have been convergence problems in the estimation due to the small number of observations. Data for all countries and also for the entire euro area have been downloaded from Eurostat. The data series for all the countries end in November 2014 and start between January 1991 and January 1996 1 . Detailed data spans and country abbreviations are given in Appendix A. Full sample inflation for all the countries has been found to be integrated of order one (details of the unit root testing, which allows for the existence of structural breaks, are available in On-line Annex, Part C). Therefore the models have been estimated in first differences). The lag length of the ARIMA process has been chosen in each recursion as the minimum for which autocorrelation of the residuals (up to order 12) is jointly insignificant at the 5% significance level. The first recursion uses the first 20% of the observations in each series, but not more than 80. Column 5 in Table A1 (see Appendix A) shows the numbers of one-step ahead forecasts made for each country and also indicates the date that is associated with the first one-step ahead forecast error for each country. For the two-step ahead forecast errors the start date is one month later, and so forth. For each forecast, the ex-post forecast errors given by (1) and observations on uncertainty (2) Table A1 , column 6). horizons h=1 and h=12 respectively). While we might observe convergence in levels of inflation in the euro area, there is clearly a divergence in inflation uncertainty. Developing from the discussion in Section 2 above it can be argued that factors beyond the Friedman-Ball or Cukierman-Meltzer hypotheses are responsible for this divergence. It can be conjectured that these factors could be related to a lack of fiscal discipline. Detailed analysis of this is, however, outside the scope of this paper. 
UNCERTAINTY AND MONETARY POLICY
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). The random variable, which is WSN-distributed with these parameters, is denoted as , sh U (the country index is omitted for simplicity). The estimation method used here is the simulated minimum distance estimation (SMDE) method (Charemza et al., 2012) . Appendix B contains a brief description of the SMDE method. The aggregated results of fitting the WSN distribution to one-step ahead uncertainties are in the On-line Annex, Part D.
The random variable V that approximates the distribution of the hypothetical uncertainty that is free from the effects of monetary policy can be recovered from the WSN distribution fitted to expost forecast errors , th u (separately for each country and each forecast horizon h) by removing from U most of the predictable components, some of which are still left due to the possible monetary policy feedback, so that
The random variable V defined by (4) 
). The ratio of the variance of the corresponding V to the RMSE of the observed ex-post errors , th u s can then be computed for each window. This ratio is called the uncertainty ratio and is defined as (see Charemza, Díaz and Makarova, 2015) :
where i stands for the country (i=1,…,16), and 
, and the thresholds m and k , which are set to   .
2 The explicit formula is given in Appendix C. The immediate interpretation of the uncertainty ratio, UR, that follows from (5) is that if the policy is effective in reducing uncertainty than the UR is greater than unity. Table 1 summarises and compares the aggregated URs and RMSEs separately for the countries investigated, and also for the entire euro area. Aggregation has been made in the following way for each country and for the euro area. First, the discounted sums across forecast horizons were obtained with the Samuelson time discount function applied (see Al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2014, for a discussion, behavioural interpretation and comparison with other concepts of time discounting). The discount weights were set first in a decaying way, with the higher weights given to short-horizon forecasts, and then were reversed, with higher weights for long horizons. These alternative ways of aggregating correspond to assigning particular importance to short-run and long-run uncertainty respectively, and are analogously called 'short' and 'long' aggregation. Next, arithmetic averages across windows were computed. The table shows that for all countries the averaged and discounted URs are greater than one, suggesting the EU monetary policy is effective overall in reducing uncertainty. Short-aggregated URs are higher than long-aggregated ones, which means that the URs for shorter horizons are generally greater than the corresponding URs for longer horizons, indicating better policy effects in reducing uncertainty for shorter horizons. The RMSEs for Estonia and Latvia are disproportionally higher than those for the other countries, which is clearly a result of the high inflation which occurred in these countries in early periods 3 . There is a positive and significant at the 10% significance level (or smaller) Spearman and Kendall rank correlation between the URs and RMSEs. This correlation is evident regardless of whether the outlier countries, Estonia and Latvia, are included or excluded. As this suggests that the URs are increasing faster as the RMSEs increase (see (5) above), it can be interpreted as observing better efficiency in reducing inflation uncertainty in countries where the levels of uncertainty were high, rather than the opposite. (1) and (2). These RMSEs are then averaged across windows and aggregated across forecast horizons using the Samuelson discount function (short aggregation) and the reverse discount function (long aggregation). The individual URs are computed using the WSN estimated parameters from (4), (5) and (C1) then aggregated similarly to RMSEs (see Appendix A Table A1 for the description of sample period for each country). Uncertainty ratio (UR) for selected euro area countries, forecast horizon h=1. Figure 3 : The URs are computed from (5) and (C1) using the WSN parameters estimated by the SMDE method with the minimum Hellinger distance criterion using the scaled forecast errors obtained from (1) and (2) It can also be noted that periods of relative success in reducing uncertainty for some of the countries correspond to periods of ineffectiveness for others. This seems to be quite natural.
Comments to
Countries may have different capacity for inflation uncertainty reduction as there are various idiosyncratic factors (see Section 2). It is not realistic to expect that the ECB policy will be effective in reducing uncertainty in the absolute sense by leading to an increase in the UR in all countries. A more plausible hypothesis could therefore be relative policy effectiveness through the convergence of the URs to a common level across the euro area countries.
THE CURE-CONVERGENCE TEST
To test the CURE-convergence hypothesis formally, let us consider a hypothetical level of UR that is identical for all the euro area countries. Convergence to such a UR is called the common uncertainty reduction effect and is abbreviated as CURE-convergence. In order to test for it, the following model has been estimated: Model (6) resembles the simple fixed-effect panel data growth model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Islam, 1995) . In fact, model (6) is not a panel data model as the dependence is on the forecast horizon rather than on time. Hence it is a static cross-section model in its essence. However, the possible mutual dependence of multi-level forecasts is expected to be transmitted into the dependence of URs for different forecast horizons, which might create effects similar to that of the time effect in panel data models with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Further difficulties in testing arise because the distributions of , ih  are likely to be nonnormal, heteroscedastic and 'autodependent', meaning they have dependence on different forecast horizons, possibly nonlinear, due to the non-normality of the residuals. This might affect the estimates of the standard errors of , ih  and consequently distort the testing results for the parameters. To ease this problem, the standard errors and consequently the p-values of the significance statistics have been estimated by applying the moving blocks bootstrap, MBB (Gonçalves, 2011) , for data ordered by forecast horizon.
Following Gonçalves, the MBB algorithm consists of the following steps:
(1) For each h, stack observations on , ih g and
, where p denotes the number of regressors in (bootstrapped) sample, estimate the parameters in (6). Due to the pseudo-sample nature rather than true sample nature of the draws, the ordinary Student-t ratios are not valid, as the OLS covariance matrix of the residuals is inconsistent. Gonçalves (2011) provides a formula for the long-run asymptotic covariance matrix for MBB pseudo-samples, which can be used for computing Student-t ratios in each draw. Such estimates of the covariance matrix are robust to cross-sectional and between-forecast horizon dependence of unknown form. The robustness does not depend on the assumption of normality for the error terms.
(4) Repeat (3) many times, collect Gonçalves' t-ratios, and use them for computing pvalues for particular estimates. Note that the direct estimate of standard errors of the parameters obtained across the pseudo-sample is not valid. In the results presented here the total number of valid bootstraps, excluding the cases where singularity has been obtained, is set at 10,000. Table 2 provides a summary of the output for the estimates of model (6)  are jointly significant in all models, and so for clarity of presentation they are not included in Table 2 .
The results given in Table 2 like France and Italy, the cross-effects are small and insignificant. This is also true for other countries in the euro area (not reported here) except for Spain, which exhibits a strongly positive and significant effect in all the specifications reported here. However, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for the cross-effect for Spain is similar to that of ()   , so its overall effect on the CUREconvergence is likely to be neutral. (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model ( 2) * indicates 5% significance according to the OLS HAC standard errors and Student-t ratios.
3) + indicates 5% significance according to MBB standard errors.
4) Country effects are jointly significant in all models. Therefore they are not included in the table.
The relevance of using the MBB covariance matrix for computing the Student-t statistics is shown by the results obtained for Regarding (ii), it is shown that in most cases, when parameters a and b are not too close to zero, the average differences between the estimates obtained by applying different criteria, do not exceed 10% of their mean.
Regarding (iii), a comparison has been made with two other different distributions used for approximating distributions of forecast inflation uncertainty, these being the two-piece normal distribution, which is often used by practitioners in central banks (see e.g. Tay and Wallis, 2000) and the generalised beta (see e.g. Clements, 2014; Kenny and Melo Fernandes, 2016) .
The goodness of fit of all these distributions varies in the sense that it is difficult to say decisively which of them is better. Overall, the WSN for the scaled data, where forecast errors are defined by (2), seems to exhibit the best fit for shorter forecast horizons. 
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this paper are quite supportive of Issing's 'one size fits all' conjecture, albeit not in the absolute sense. There are clearly no signs of homogeneity being achieved in inflation uncertainty across the euro area countries. This is not only a case of Greece versus the rest of the euro area, as it also applies to more stable countries like France and Italy. Fiscal and institutional discrepancies within the Union are still too large for this sort of convergence. As found by Rossi and Sekhposyan (forthcoming), the idiosyncratic effects on inflation uncertainty still exist and might even cause divergence in it. However, it is argued here that without the monetary policy of the ECB this divergence would have been worse. The CURE-convergence, which is the tendency of the relative ECB policy effects on inflation uncertainty to be unified across countries, is clearly detected. This may be a sign of institutional adjustment and also of some effectiveness in monetary policy. At the same time, the results presented here do not confirm the Arnold and Lemmen (2008) conjecture that inflation uncertainty across the euro area countries is negatively related to the degree of their influence on ECB policy. On the contrary, this paper provides statistical evidence for the long-run tendency of the ECB's monetary policy to affect inflation uncertainty in all countries in an equal way, regardless of their influence.
On the methodological side, the paper uses a cross-section model which exhibits heterogeneity similar to that of the fixed effects panel data models and can be used for analysing forecast effects jointly for different horizons. However, the stochastic structure of such models can be quite complicated and might require the application of methods that allow for nonlinear dependence. The two-step method applied here for estimating the forecasting model first and then analysing the distributions of forecast errors is a novel approach, though it might not be the most efficient. However, the joint estimation of the ARIMA-GARCH model with skew-normal uncertainty still poses some statistical questions, which have not yet been fully resolved.
Of the 18 countries in the euro area, Cyprus and Slovakia were the only two countries for which the maximum likelihood ARIMA-GARCH model estimation failed and no convergence was achieved.
Therefore these countries have been excluded, so the number of countries considered is 16.
The common date for all countries for which Note that the RMSEs are computed using moving windows of 120  . Therefore the number of observations for each country in columns (5) and (6) in Table A1 differs by 118.   TABLE A1. Description of data spans and recursions.
The simulated minimum distance method (SMDE) estimates of a vector of parameters  ( k    ), introduced by Charemza et al., (2012) , are given by:
arg min ( , )
Due to the nonlinear nature of (3), the minimisation criteria and the constraints imposed, the function in (B1) has been minimised using the grid search algorithm (for a review and comparison of numerical techniques in grid search see e.g. Jiménez, Lázaro and Dorronsoro, 2009) . Denoting the number of grids (for each of the estimated parameters) by _n, the maximum depth of grid by _d, and the initial length of the interval where the particular parameter is searched by _l 0 (_n and _d are identical for all parameters) gives the length _l of the last interval, giving the precision of the estimation, as In practice, however, the accuracy of minimisation can be affected by the appearance of cells with zero frequency in the empirical histogram, which can result from a combination of small sample size and the presence of outliers. The algorithm sets the number of cells automatically, with the lower constraint on the number of cells equal to 9. Although the Mandal, Basu and Pardo (2010) empty cells penalty is implemented in the algorithm, the appearance of a substantial number of empty cells affects the estimation. Because of that, it has been decided to limit the maximum forecast horizon to 18 in the computation of the CURE-convergence test, as for longer horizons where there are fewer observations in the sample, the number of empty cells becomes significant and the fit is generally worse due to appearance of outliers.
Another problem arises because the criterion function (B1), where the entries are simulated, is 'noisy', so that an accidental extremum can be obtained outside the true extremum due to the stochastic nature of the observations (see e.g. Spall, 2003) . In order to safeguard against this, each search was repeated 50 times and the median result was chosen.
